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Abstract 
 
The present study assesses the existence of fiscal strategic interactions between 
Portuguese municipalities for the Personal Income Tax’s variable participation rate. With 
fiscal decentralization at the centre of the current Portuguese policy agenda, 
understanding whether strategic interactions are a real phenomenon is not only of 
academic interest but can also help design a better institutional framework. Our study 
uses panel data for all the 278 municipalities of mainland Portugal, covering the period 
2008–2015. The analysis of Moran’s I statistic provides some evidence of neighbourhood 
effects. To test whether the detected neighbourhood effects can be attributed to strategic 
interactions, we estimate five spatial panel data models using the quasi-maximum 
likelihood method. There is little evidence that strategic interactions in the participat ion 
rates occur among Portuguese municipalities. We find a positive and statistica lly 
significant spatial dependence parameter in only one of the spatial panel models 
considered. 
 
JEL Codes: C23; H71; H73 
Keywords: Strategic interaction; Spatial panel data models; Local governments ; 
Portugal 
 
  
  
 iv 
Resumo 
 
Este estudo analisa a existência de interações estratégicas fiscais entre os 
municípios portugueses, no caso da taxa de participação variável no Imposto sobre o 
Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares (IRS). Com a descentralização orçamental no centro 
da agenda política portuguesa atual, perceber se as interações estratégicas são um 
fenómeno real não é apenas de interesse académico, na medida em que também pode 
ajudar no desenho de um quadro institucional mais adequado. O estudo utiliza dados em 
painel para os 278 municípios do continente português, cobrindo o período 2008-2015. 
A análise da estatística I de Moran fornece alguma evidência de efeitos de vizinhança. 
Para testar se os efeitos de vizinhança detetados podem ser atribuídos a interações 
estratégicas, procedeu-se à estimação de cinco modelos espaciais de dados em painel, 
aplicando o método de quase-máxima verossimilhança. Existe pouca evidência de 
interações estratégicas nas taxas de participação entre os municípios portugueses. 
Encontrou-se um parâmetro de dependência espacial positivo e estatisticamente 
significativo em apenas um dos modelos espaciais de dados em painel considerados. 
 
 
Códigos JEL: C23; H71; H73 
Palavras-chave: Interação estratégica; Modelos espaciais de dados em painel; 
Municípios; Portugal 
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Introduction 
 
With the development of spatial econometrics, an increasing number of empirica l 
studies have tested for strategic interaction among local jurisdictions of different 
countries over the last two decades. This has provided an assessment of different types of 
spatial-dependent behaviour in local public finances: expenditure spillovers, tax and 
welfare competition and yardstick competition. 
Fiscal spatial interaction among municipalities is a very recent research theme in 
Portugal, and thus still with very few studies: to the best of our knowledge, there are only 
three papers covering strategic interaction on the revenue side – Coimbra et al. (2011), 
Costa et al. (2011) and Costa and Carvalho (2013) – and three other assessing it on the 
expenditure side – Barreira (2010), Barreira (2011) and Costa et al. (2015). 
From 2007 onwards, the Portuguese municipalities were given the ability to 
decide to return to their taxpayers up to 5% of the Personal Income Tax collected. Only 
two studies – Coimbra et al. (2011) and Costa et al. (2011) – have tested for spatial 
interactions regarding this local public revenue, using cross-sectional data for the year 
2009. The empirical results for the variable participation rate in the Personal Income Tax 
were unstable and partially inconclusive. The authors believe the results may have been 
influenced not only by the small amplitude of the rate variable, but also because, in 2009, 
strategic interaction concerning this rate was still unlikely to emerge. We intend to 
contribute to close this gap, taking advantage of an increased variability in time, using 
panel data for the 2008–2015 period for all the 278 mainland Portuguese municipalities. 
Our objective is to assess the existence of fiscal strategic interactions among 
Portuguese municipalities regarding the variable participation rate in the Personal Income 
Tax. Based on the explanations of strategic interaction offered in the literature – 
expenditure spillovers, yardstick competition and tax/welfare competition –, we attempt 
to identify the most likely driver of that potential interaction. With fiscal decentralizat io n 
at the centre of the current Portuguese policy agenda, understanding whether strategic 
interaction is a real phenomenon is not only of academic interest, but can also help 
reformists in designing a better institutional framework. We believe this gives our study 
additional relevance. 
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The study is organized in six sections. After the Introduction, Chapter 1 presents 
a brief overview of the literature on horizontal strategic interaction among local 
governments. The theoretical framework is based on the “spillover” and “resource-flow” 
models. These two broad categories of models capture the main theories that explain 
strategic interactions: expenditure spillovers, tax/welfare competition and yardstick 
competition. We describe each of the theories separately. Lastly, we present the state of 
the art of the empirical studies, focusing mainly on the revenue side. 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the Portuguese institutional framework. The 
local government unit on which we focus is the municipality. We briefly describe the 
decentralization path that has been followed since democracy was re-established in 1974. 
In particular, we highlight the previous and most recent Local Finance Laws (the Law 
2/2007, January 15th, and the current Law 73/2013, September 3rd), which gave 
municipalities the ability to decide the participation rate in the Personal Income Tax (the 
strategic variable of our study), and its predicted effects: an increase in inter-municipa l 
tax competition and in the local political accountability on the revenue side. We discuss 
the current financial state of municipalities; despite the noticeable increase in 
discretionary power on the revenue side, municipalities still depend mainly on transfers 
from the central government to fund their expenditures. We enumerate the current fiscal 
competences of the Portuguese municipalities and explain how the Portuguese local 
elections work. Within the Portuguese institutional framework, we present the case for 
why we believe the yardstick competition hypothesis to have, a priori, the most 
explanatory power in the case of our strategic variable of choice. 
In Chapter 3, we present a summary of the standard methodology used to assess 
horizontal spatial strategic interactions in local public finances. This includes the 
presentation of the general form of the econometric model, of the criteria for the definit io n 
of neighbourhood (we discuss the spatial weights matrix to be used in the study) and of 
some model limitations that the estimation strategy has to overcome. We present the case 
for using panel data, the spatial panel data models to be estimated, and the estimation 
strategy: the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood  (QML) method. 
In Chapter 4, we start with a preliminary spatial analysis by exploring the Moran's 
I and LISA statistics. We present the data and the descriptive statistics for the variables 
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used in the study and the analyses of the empirical results obtained from the estimation 
of the spatial panel data models. 
Finally, in the last section, we present the main conclusions.  
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Chapter 1. Theoretical framework 
 
Horizontal strategic interaction between local governments is based on the idea 
that jurisdictions do not act in isolation. Jurisdictions may be significantly influenced and 
may react to the policies taken by neighbouring jurisdictions. Simply put, strategic 
interaction occurs when there is a correlation between the variance of tax rates or 
expenditure levels of local jurisdictions which is driven by strategic considerations (i.e., 
excluding the effects of common unobserved shocks following a spatial pattern). 
In order to empirically assess strategic interaction, most studies estimate a 
reaction function in which the value of a strategic fiscal policy variable in a jurisdict ion 
is a function of spatially weighted decisions of neighbouring jurisdictions (Lyytikäinen, 
2012). Generally, when the slope of the reaction function – which measures how a change 
in the fiscal variable in a neighbouring jurisdiction influences the jurisdiction’s own 
variable (Sedmihradská, 2013) – is significantly different from zero, we are in the 
presence of strategic interaction for that strategic fiscal policy variable. 
The reaction function captures the main theories for explaining strategic 
interaction among local governments based on two broad categories of models: the 
spillover models and the resource-flow models (Brueckner, 2003).  
Spillover models rely on the assumption that each jurisdiction decides on the level 
of a strategic policy variable, but the jurisdiction is also directly affected by the decisions 
of neighbouring jurisdictions concerning that variable, which means that neighbour ing 
decisions have spillover effects on the decisions of a given local government (Brueckner 
and Saavedra, 2001; Brueckner, 2003; Costa et al., 2011). 
In resource-flow models, decisions on a strategic fiscal policy variable affect the 
flow of resources between jurisdictions. Since the availability of local resources is finite, 
its distribution among jurisdictions depends, directly, on the decisions of each jurisdict ion 
and, indirectly, on the decisions of the surrounding jurisdictions to attract those resources. 
In other words, when deciding on a strategic variable, jurisdictions are not directly 
influenced by the decisions concerning this variable in the neighbouring jurisdictions, but 
are indirectly affected by the amount of resources available in the neighbour ing 
jurisdictions, which leads to strategic behaviour (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001, 
Brueckner, 2003; Costa et al., 2011). 
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Within the theoretical explanations of strategic interaction, expenditure spillovers 
and yardstick competition models rely on spillover models, while tax and welfare 
competition fundaments are captured by resource-flow models. 
In this chapter, we present the state of the art of the theoretical explanations of 
strategic interactions, as well as an overview of the empirical studies published in this 
field, both abroad and in Portugal. 
 
1.1. The explanations of strategic interaction  
 
In this section we explore the theoretical explanations of strategic interactions 
found in the literature. 
 
Expenditure spillovers 
 
The first explanation brought forward to explain strategic interactions relying on 
spillover models is that of expenditure spillovers, which arise from public expenditures 
on local public goods and services which can have beneficial or detrimental (spillover) 
effects on the welfare of residents in nearby jurisdictions (Revelli, 2002). 
If a jurisdiction decides on increasing the expenditure of complementa ry 
(competing) local public goods, such as, e.g., roads (schools), neighbour ing 
municipalities are likely to boost (constrain) their own expenditures to overcome (take 
advantage of) the negative (positive) spillover effects. Thus, the optimal level of 
expenditure in each jurisdiction depends on the expenditure decisions in neighbour ing 
jurisdictions (Geys, 2006). 
Moreover, since expenditure levels may be spatially correlated among 
jurisdictions, the same will hold for tax rates (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). When a public 
good provided by a neighbouring jurisdiction has benefits in a certain jurisdiction, the 
latter may be able to provide less of that good, which requires lower financial needs. Thus, 
the presence of positive (negative) spillovers can also lead to negative (positive ) 
interactions in tax rates (Baskaran, 2014). 
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Yardstick competition 
 
The second explanation of strategic interaction that falls into spillover models, 
incidentally the most recent explanation offered in the local public finance literature, is 
yardstick competition. Under yardstick competition, first expressed by Shleifer (1985) 
and Salmon (1987), later explored by Case et al. (1993) and modelled by Besley and Case 
(1995), fiscal interactions arise from a political agency problem between local politicians 
and their constituency. 
This hypothesis explains fiscal interactions without invoking the concept of 
mobility of the tax base, through what Allers and Elhorst (2005:1) call the “vote 
mechanism”. Jurisdictions compete for votes in the political market.  
Yardstick competition derives from the benefit spillover model as a form of 
informational externality/spillover. The framework assumes imperfect and asymmetr ic 
information between voters and local politicians. Unlike policy authorities, voters do not 
have complete information on how many public goods and services can be provided with 
a certain level of tax rates. There are two types of local politicians: good, non rent-
seeking, politicians and bad, rent-seeking, politicians. The latter try to finance their 
whims at taxpayers’ expenses (Besley and Case, 1995). Such selfish and opportunist ic 
behaviour generates incentives to prevent relevant information from being fully availab le 
to their constituencies, so they can more easily raise tax rates to collect more revenue than 
that needed to finance the optimal level of local public goods; thus, extra tax revenue is 
used as political rents for their own benefit. The political agency problem arises because 
voters do not clearly distinguish between the two types of politicians. 
Under such circumstances, voters have the possibility, through the media or other 
sources of information, to use the fiscal situation of neighbouring jurisdictions as 
yardsticks to compare and appraise their own local incumbents’ relative performance, 
thus being able to reduce informational problems they are confronted with as well as to 
circumvent and overcome the political agency problems (Salmon, 1987; Schaltegger and 
Küttel, 2002). In other words, voters use information from neighbouring jurisdictions’ 
tax rates and expenditure levels as a benchmark for them to assess the costs and suitability 
of their own jurisdiction’s policies (Shleifer, 1985; Besley and Case, 1995; Allers and 
Elhorst, 2005). 
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In a representative democracy, if voters are indeed aware and sensitive to events 
outside their immediate jurisdictions (as is assumed by the yardstick competit ion 
hypothesis), they can use this simple strategy, which enables a more accurate judgment 
of their local politician’s behaviour. 
Neighbouring jurisdictions’ choices provide, therefore, a positive informationa l 
externality (Bordignon et al., 2003), helping voters to discriminate between the two 
different types of politicians. The citizens’ ability to use information from neighbour ing 
jurisdictions improves the quality assessment of their own jurisdiction (voters can better 
judge if their political representatives are rent-seeking or not). Because the yardstick 
mechanism is likely to increase political accountability, it can be seen as an additiona l 
argument in favour of decentralization (Sedmihradská, 2013). 
A bad relative performance by local politicians will penalize their chances of re-
election, thus decreasing the incentives for fiscal exploitation by rent-seeking politicians 
(Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998). Consequently, incumbents are compelled to look at the 
taxation behaviour of neighbouring local politicians and align their taxes to avoid being 
punished at the polls; this sets the stage for tax-mimicking behaviour (Sollé-Ollé, 2003). 
Assuming local politicians are rational agents, they anticipate voters’ yardstick 
behaviour and take it into account before deciding on their own policies to avoid being 
perceived by voters as bad politicians and to be voted-out on elections. As a consequence, 
local politicians take directly into account not only their own jurisdiction’s politica l 
opponents but also the policy decisions taken in neighbouring jurisdictions, to maximize 
their chances to remain in power. 
In a setting where benevolent, non rent-seeking politicians exist, they will 
ultimately generate positive informational externalities, which voters can use to punish 
the selfish and opportunistic politicians at the local elections. Thus, if politicians of the 
latter type do not engage in tax mimicking, their re-election chances hinder (Besley and 
Case, 1995; Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998). 
As a result, the yardstick mechanism leads to strategic interactions in the form of 
mimicking behaviour among politicians, who adapt their decisions to the ones of their 
neighbours in order to provide a signal to voters on the quality of their performance and, 
through it, to increase their chances of re-election (Buettner and Schwerin, 2016). 
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The task of comparing the fiscal performance of nearby jurisdictions will be 
harder for voters when relevant information is not readily available or when the tax rates 
differ greatly from one jurisdiction to another (Reulier and Rocaboy, 2009). Indeed, the 
more complex the institutional framework, the easier it is for rent-seeking politicians to 
justify tax rate increases without facing electoral consequences. 
In a decentralized tax system, the political consequences of tax changes depend 
on the surrounding circumstances (Besley and Case, 1995). A tax increase can be better 
tolerated by voters when there are similar increases in neighbouring jurisdictions. 
Likewise, if voters observe tax cuts in neighbouring jurisdictions, they are less likely to 
accept their local politician not to lower taxes too. Similarly, the higher the number of 
geographical neighbours surrounding a jurisdiction, the easier and more effective one can 
expect this yardstick comparison mechanism to be. 
Under yardstick competition, incumbents are more likely to face defeat if they 
increase taxes, and less likely to lose if their neighbours increase taxes. Thus, electoral 
defeat is positively correlated with tax increases in each jurisdiction, and negative ly 
correlated with tax increases in neighbouring jurisdictions (Besley and Case, 1995). 
Moreover, voters have more difficulty in identifying the politician responsible for 
a tax change in coalitions, due to a lower “clarity of responsibility” (Solé-Ollé, 2003:686). 
This makes the yardstick mechanism to be less effective, since local coalitio n 
governments are less likely to be held accountable for their economic performance and 
thus will be less worried with mimicking their neighbours’ tax policies. This effect is 
called the political fragmentation effect, and it can be measured by the number of parties 
forming a coalition (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). 
Another corollary from the electoral accountability hypothesis is that in 
jurisdictions where incumbents cannot run for re-election because of institutional binding 
term limits, one can expect ideological factors to be more dominant in the decision-
making process, and mimicking behaviour of neighbouring jurisdictions’ policies tends 
to be absent (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998). Thus, term-limited mayors will tend to set 
higher tax rates than those of their counterparts (Padovano and Petrarca, 2014). In this 
case, the yardstick competition hypothesis can be tested by comparing jurisdictions 
whose politicians are eligible for re-election to those jurisdictions whose politicians are 
not. If strategic interaction is only found in the former, there is evidence for yardstick 
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competition. In contrast, under tax competition, mimicking behaviour should occur 
regardless of re-election opportunities (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). 
A third corollary is that expected competition for votes tends to be higher in 
election years. On the other hand, if strategic interactions are driven by the fear of loss of 
tax bases, as tax competition predicts, there is little reason to expect interactions to be 
stronger when electoral accountability is higher (Solé-Ollé, 2003). 
In addition to electoral accountability, other determinants also play a role on the 
effectiveness of yardstick competition. In particular, mimicking behaviour is expected to 
be less pronounced in jurisdictions governed by mayors elected by a large share of the 
votes or by coalitions backed by a large share of the city council. One reason for that is 
that politicians in such a comfortable position are confident of being re-elected, so they 
enjoy more freedom to set their own tax policies. In other words, mimicking neighbour ing 
is expected to decrease as the electoral margin increases (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). More 
generally, only incumbent governments that face uncertain electoral outcomes are 
expected to engage in mimicking behaviour (Bordignon et al., 2003). According to 
Padovano and Petrarca (2014), the popularity of the incumbent is typically measured by 
the share of votes obtained in the last election results. 
Another prediction under the yardstick competition theory is related to the 
partisanship effect. Mimicking behaviour is expected to be stronger when right-wing 
parties are in control, since right-wing voters are generally more sensitive to tax increases 
in neighbouring jurisdictions than left-wing voters (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). On the 
other hand, when left-wing parties are in control, mimicking behaviour is expected to be 
less pronounced, since left-wing parties are expected to be less sensitive to initiatives 
from neighbouring jurisdictions to reduce taxes (Solé-Ollé, 2003). 
 
Tax and welfare competition 
 
A third theoretical explanation of strategic interactions is that of tax competition, 
first discussed in Tiebout (1956) and further developed by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski (1986), which arises from mobility- led competition. This explanat io n 
of strategic competition is based on the interjurisdictional mobility of the tax base. 
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The analytical framework for tax competition is based on resource-flow models a 
la Tiebout (1956), under which resource flows between jurisdictions are the source of 
strategic interaction, thus obviating the case for political competition (Besley and Case, 
1995). Under this hypothesis, fiscal interdependence occurs when local jurisdictions 
decide on their tax rates taking into account its effects on mobile resources. 
In Tiebout (1956), individuals (“consumer-voters”) are aware of the differences 
in tax and expenditure patterns among jurisdictions and they react accordingly by moving 
to the jurisdiction that best satisfies their preference patterns. In Tiebout (1956)-type 
models, jurisdictions finance the provision of public goods with a tax on local capital. 
Local capital is nationally fixed but it is mobile across jurisdictions. The spatial 
distribution of firms and individuals – mobile tax bases in each jurisdiction – depend both 
on the jurisdiction’s tax rates and on those of the neighbouring jurisdictions. Ceteris 
paribus, a higher tax on capital in a given jurisdiction would benefit neighbour ing 
jurisdictions with the inflow of mobile factors (Buettner and Schwerin, 2016). 
Consequentially, each jurisdiction is indirectly affected by the policies of neighbour ing 
jurisdictions, making tax policy decisions interdependent, generating strategic interact io n 
(Revelli, 2002; Geys, 2006). Allers and Elhorst (2005:1) label the option of mobile tax 
bases to escape tax increases the “exit mechanism”. 
If competition for resources is high, one can expect local tax rates to be low, as 
jurisdictions attempt to keep their tax base. While the literature admits competition to be 
beneficial for consumers (because it generates a diversity of public-good choices), there 
is also view (which has since sparked a debate on the merits of decentralization) that 
follows on the bad side of local competition and strategic behaviour: welfare losses (Case 
et al., 1993). Low local tax rates set as a result of interjurisdictional competition to attract 
capital flows could lead to inefficient taxation and to under-provision of public goods as 
taxes are used to finance them (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001). 
A related literature, which can be seen as a direct extension of the tax competit ion 
models, is the welfare competition model. In this fourth explanation of fiscal 
interdependence across jurisdictions, strategic interaction arises from the 
interjurisdictional mobility of residents who seek benefits from local state governments ’ 
social welfare redistribution programs (“welfare migration” occurs). In this case, the 
competitive behaviour of local jurisdictions is more peculiar. Instead of trying to attract 
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and maintain a mobile tax-base, local politicians’ decisions are such that aim at keeping 
the high income residents and repel the social welfare recipients (Saavedra, 2000). 
In both tax and welfare competition models, firms and individuals are expected to 
choose to locate in the jurisdiction that offers them the best combination of the 
expenditure-revenue bundle (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998). 
 
1.2. Overview of empirical studies 
 
The empirical literature on strategic horizontal interactions among local 
governments has been rapidly expanding, to a large extent because of recent 
developments both theoretically and in spatial econometrics. Table 1 provides an 
overview of empirical studies. Most empirical studies on the revenue side analyse taxes 
where strategic interaction is more likely to occur (business tax and income tax). A 
significant number of these studies also test the yardstick hypothesis. In general, as stated 
in Gérard et al. (2010) and Buettner and Schwerin (2016), the empirical literature finds 
evidence of strategic interactions between local governments. 
Of the selected 27 papers, only Lyytikäinen (2012) and Baskaran (2014) found no 
evidence of interactions in tax rates. Both these papers use non-traditional regressions. 
Lyytikäinen (2012) uses a Quasi-experimental design, while Baskaran (2014) uses the 
Difference in Difference and the Spatial Lag framework with unconventiona l 
instruments. These authors suggest the traditional literature may be overestimating the 
degree of interdependence in tax rates. 
Regarding empirical evidence for Portugal, and to the best of our knowledge, 
three papers have tested for fiscal strategic interactions on the revenue side – Coimbra et 
al. (2011), Costa et al. (2011) and Costa and Carvalho (2013) –, and three other on the 
expenditure side – Barreira (2010), Barreira (2011) and Costa et al. (2015). Coimbra et 
al. (2011) and Costa et al. (2011) assessed the existence of fiscal strategic interactions for 
the variable participation rate in the Personal Income Tax. In both papers, the empirica l 
results for this tax rate were unstable and partially inconclusive. The authors believe the 
results may have been influenced by the small amplitude of the rate variable and because, 
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in 2009 (both studies use cross-sectional data for that year), strategic interactio ns 
concerning this tax rate were still unlikely to have emerged.1 
                                                 
1 As explained in section 2.3., the participation rate in the Personal Income Tax varies from 0% to 5%. In 
2008, municipalities were able to set their participation rate using this 5% margin. In 2009, 127 
municipalities (over 40% of the 308 municipalities) did not actively choose a tax rate; thus their tax rate 
was set to 0% by Law to benefit the local taxpayers, further limiting the observed variability of the rate. 
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Table 1 
Overview of empirical studies 
 
Source: Own research.  
Country Territorial unit
Besley and Case (1995) United States of America Continental States 1960–1988 Effective income-tax liabilities Yes Yardstick competition
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) Belgium Municipalities 1991 Income tax and property tax Yes —
Saavedra (2000) United States of America States 1985, 1990, 1995 Benefit support program Yes Welfare competition
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) United States of America
Cities in the Boston metropolitan 
area 1980, 1990 Property tax Yes Tax competition
Buettner (2001) Germany
Municipalities in the state of Baden-
Württemberg 1981–1996 Business tax Yes Tax competition
Revelli (2002) England Non-metropolitan districts 1990
Public expenditure per capita and property 
tax Yes —
Schaltegger and Küttel (2002) Switzerland Cantons 1980–1998 Fiscal autonomy and legislation Yes Yardstick competition
Bordignon et al. (2003) Italy
Municipalities in the Province of 
Milan 2000 Property tax Yes Yardstick competition
Solé-Ollé (2003) Spain Municipalities 1992–1999 Property tax, vehicle tax and business tax Yes Yardstick competition
Allers and Elhorst (2005) Netherlands Municipalities 2002 Property tax Yes Yardstick competition
Geys (2006) Belgium Municipalities of the Flemish Region 2000 Efficiency ratings Yes —
Elhorst and Fréret (2009) France Mainland departments 1992–2000 Welfare spending Yes Yardstick competition
Reulier and Rocaboy (2009) France Regions 1986–1999 Property tax, housing tax and business tax Yes
Yardstick competition [property tax] 
and tax competition [business tax] 
Barreira (2010) Portugal
Municipalities of the Northern 
Region 1998-2008 Public expenditure per capita Yes Expenditure spillovers
Gérard et al. (2010) Belgium Municipalities 1985–2004 Surcharges on income tax and property tax 
Yes [surcharge on labour 
income tax] —
Barreira (2011) Portugal
Municipalities of the Southern Region 
of Algarve 1998-2007 Public expenditure per capita Yes Expenditure spillovers
Delgado and Mayor (2011) Spain Municipalities in Asturias 2004
Property tax, motor vehicle tax and building 
activities tax
Yes [property tax and 
building activities tax] —
Coimbra et al. (2011) Portugal Mainland municipalities 2000–2009 
Property tax, surcharge on business tax, 
participation in income tax Yes —
Costa et al. (2011) Portugal Mainland municipalities 2000–2009 
Property tax, surcharge on business tax, 
participation in income tax Yes
Yardstick competition [Property tax 
and surcharge on business tax]
Lyytikäinen (2012) Finland Municipalities 1993–2004 Property tax No —
Costa and Carvalho (2013) Portugal Mainland municipalities 2003–2011 Property tax Yes Yardstick competition
Malderen and Gérard (2013) Belgium Municipalities of the Walloon Region 2012 Surcharges on income tax and property tax Yes —
Sedmihradská (2013) Czech Republic Municipalities 2009–2013 Property tax Yes Yardstick competition
Baskaran (2014) Germany
Municipalities in the state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia 2003 Property tax and business tax No —
Padovano and Petrarca (2014) Italy Mmunicipalities 1995–2004 Property tax Yes Yardstick competition
Costa et al. (2015) Portugal Mainland municipalities 1986-2006 Expenditure levels per capita Yes
Expenditure spillovers and tax 
competition
Buettner and Schwerin (2016) Germany
Municipalities in the state of Baden-
Württemberg 2011 Business tax Yes Yardstick competition
Source of strategic interactionAuthors Time period Fiscal tool Evidence of strategic interaction
Spatial dimension
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Chapter 2. Portuguese local institutional framework 
 
With the intent of exploring strategic interactions among decentralized 
government units in Portugal, this chapter provides features of the institutiona l 
framework that characterize those units, namely those relevant for enabling financ ia l 
autonomy to choose revenue and expenditure levels. 
In Portugal, there are two sublevels of government at the local level: 
municipalities (“municípios”) and civil parishes (“freguesias”).  
The local government unit we will focus on is the municipality. That is because 
Portuguese municipalities are the most important and the highest- level local authorities, 
both in political and financial power. Being closer to the population than central authority, 
they are responsible for improving the well-being of the residents in their jurisdictions. 
In particular, municipalities promote social and economic development, improve the 
territorial organization (urban and local planning) and supply a wide range of local public 
goods and services (such as water and sewage, transportation, housing, healthcare, 
education, culture, sports, environmental protection and civil protection assistance) 
(Baleiras, 1997; Veiga, 2003; Veiga and Pinho, 2007; Castro and Martins, 2013). The 
budgeting rules, competences and policy instruments are the same for all Portuguese 
mainland municipalities regardless of their size (Veiga, 2003; Veiga and Veiga, 2007; 
Barreira, 2011). 
Civil parishes (“freguesias”), on the other hand, are the lowest administrative unit 
in Portugal. They have a very limited scope of competencies, performing tasks delegated 
from their respective municipalities (Jorge et al., 2006; Costa et al., 2015). 
In Portugal there are currently 308 municipalities (278 in mainland and 30 in the 
islands of Madeira and Azores) and 3092 civil parishes. 
 
2.1. Decentralization path in Portugal 
 
After a 48-year period of dictatorship, with the revolution of April 25, 1974, 
democracy was re-established in Portugal. 
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The Portuguese Constitution of 1976 introduced major changes to local 
governments, including administrative decentralization, local autonomy and own 
property and financing for local authorities (Teixeira et al., 2015). 
Since then, over the last 40 years, there has been a total of six Local Finance Laws 
approved, each of which set in motion a process of progressive decentralization of 
competencies from the central government to local authorities in order to generate a more 
efficient allocation of resources (Costa et al., 2015; Martins and Veiga, 2013). 
In particular, municipalities have benefited from a higher autonomy, more 
discretionary power and more resources, which has translated into an increasing role in 
the areas of economic policy and in the provision of local public goods and services 
(Pinho and Veiga, 2005; Coimbra et al., 2011). 
In the last few years, fiscal decentralization has been at the centre of the 
Portuguese policy agenda. Decentralization is believed to improve governance (by 
increasing local responsiveness), allocative efficiency and political participation and 
accountability (Sedmihradská, 2013). Structural reforms to increase decentralization in 
the recent context of the 2011–2014 international financial assistance programme to 
Portugal have resulted in changes in the distribution of powers and responsibilities of 
municipalities. 
In particular, with the previous and current Local Finance Laws (the Law 2/2007, 
January 15th, and the current Law 73/2013, September 3rd), legislative changes and new 
measures were approved aimed at increasing the fiscal competences of municipalities in 
the revenue side; promoting financial autonomy, inter-municipal fiscal competition and 
electoral accountability, as well as cost reductions and transparency in municipa l 
management as a way to foster local development (Costa, 2011; Veiga et al., 2015). On 
February 16th, 2017, a law proposal (Law Proposal 62/XIII) has been presented by the 
government to the parliament with the objective of transferring yet more central powers 
to local powers, particularly in the case of the Municipal Tax on Real Property (“IMI”), 
to further strengthen these goals. It has not yet been approved by the parliament. 
These consecutive and still ongoing decentralisation reforms have been put into 
place with the belief that, despite the current financial difficulties, local politicians and 
local voters have reached a stage of democratic maturity and are now more concerned 
with sustainability, quality of management, transparency and political accountability 
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(Coimbra et al., 2011; and Costa, 2011). These new challenges facing municipalit ies 
require them to formulate strategic decisions in terms of financial management. The 
current new environment has led to a higher perception of growing competition among 
municipalities, especially on the revenue side, where local fiscal competences have been 
increased (Costa and Lança, 2013). This has made policies to reduce the residents’ fiscal 
burden more appealing than before (Costa, 2011). 
It is worthwhile to point out that fiscal spatial interaction is still a very recent 
phenomenon in Portugal, because fiscal instruments in the past have never been relevant 
enough to spark spatial interactions, especially on the revenue side. Historically, local 
competition was mainly driven by the expenditure side, which is now relatively less 
importance because most of the needs on local infrastructure are already satisfied (Costa 
et al., 2011; Costa and Carvalho, 2013). 
Furthermore, with the decentralization reforms and the maturing of democracy, 
voters have become more sophisticated and their scrutiny is likely to increase on the 
revenue side, since they have easy access to readily available relevant information on the 
tax rates municipalities set. This allows voters to use such information to evaluate and 
hold their local politicians accountable (voters use taxes as the best indicator of relative 
competency because other types of output/performance indicators at the municipal level 
practically do not exist in Portugal) (Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Costa et al., 2015). 
 
2.2. Fiscal competences of Portuguese municipalities 
 
The Portuguese Constitution endows municipalities with financial autonomy. 
However, they are subject to several control mechanisms put in place by the central 
government, which limit their access to revenues and expenditure choices (Veiga, 2003). 
Municipalities rely on unconditional transfers, both from the central government 
and the European Union, and on own fiscal revenues as main sources of municipa l 
revenue (Veiga, 2003; Coimbra et al., 2011). The transfers have a redistributive nature. 
They aim to address both vertical and horizontal imbalances (the importance of transfers 
in the total municipal revenue is negatively related with the level of development of each 
municipality) (Coimbra et al., 2011; Costa and Carvalho, 2013). 
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Municipal taxes are collected by the central government and then returned to the 
municipality as fiscal revenue. Municipalities have some discretionary power to modify 
the rates of these taxes (Jorge et al., 2006). Municipal taxes are the following: the variable 
participation in the Personal Income Tax (“participação variável no IRS”), Municipal Tax 
on Real Property (“IMI”), Municipal Tax on Real Estate Transfer (“IMT”), a surcharge 
on Corporate Income Tax (“Derrama”) and the Tax on Vehicle Circulation (“IUC”) 
(Costa and Carvalho, 2013; Teixeira et al., 2015). 
Despite the mentioned decentralization, the fiscal autonomy of Portuguese 
municipalities is still relatively low (Costa, 2006). On average, in 2015, municipal taxes 
accounted for 37.9% of total revenues of Portuguese municipalities, while transfers 
accounted for 41.1%, according to numbers taken from the management accounts of the 
Portuguese Directorate-General for Local Authorities. However, if we compare the 
current average fiscal autonomy levels to those of 1986 (18% of total revenues for 
municipal taxes and 63% of total revenues for transfers), the data suggest that the 
discretionary power on the revenue side has been increasing as a reflection of the 
decentralization policies taken in Portugal (Costa et al., 2015). 
Regardless of recent improvements, transfers from the central government 
continue to be the most important source of municipal funding. This dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers can be demonstrated by the fact that in about half of the 
Portuguese municipalities (most of them located in the inner Portuguese mainland) own-
levied tax revenues historically account for less than 25% of total revenue. This is because 
many municipalities have very low tax bases; smaller municipalities are very sparsely 
populated (about 35% of municipalities have less than 10 000 residents) and lack 
meaningful economic activity (Costa, 2011; Costa and Carvalho, 2013). 
 
2.3. The variable participation rate in the Personal Income Tax 
 
The Local Finance Law of 2007 provided municipalities with the ability to 
participate in a percentage of the revenue collected from the Personal Income Tax (“IRS”) 
(the law took effect on January 15th, 2007). The current Local Finance Law (Law 73/2013 
of September 3rd) maintained this new responsibility (articles 25 and 26) and added new 
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requirements on local accountability and on the provision of information to local voters 
(Costa and Lança, 2013; Teixeira et al., 2015). 
As a result, since 2007, Portuguese municipalities are entitled to 5% of the 
Personal Income Tax collected by the central government over the taxpayers who are 
resident in the municipality. Municipalities are able to decide, on a yearly basis, on what 
to do with this tax revenue: whether to keep it as revenue or to return it, in part or totally, 
to the benefit of their local taxpayers. This new competence is called the variable 
participation rate in the Personal Income Tax. A 5% participation rate (maximum rate) 
means that the municipality keeps all the income tax revenue it is entitled to. By setting 
a participation rate below 5%, the municipality is deciding to give a percentage of the 
income tax that is part of its tax revenue to its taxpayers. Taxpayers will also benefit if 
the municipality does not actively decide on the participation rate (this happens when a 
municipality fails to communicate its desired variable participation tax rate to the tax 
authority); in this case, the rate is set to 0% (minimum rate) by default, with the 5% of 
the tax collection reverting in favour of the local taxpayers. 
This new municipal fiscal tool was adopted with the goal of increasing 
decentralization and local autonomy. Portuguese policy-makers were positive that this 
new tool could lead to a reduction of public expenditure while, at the same time, making 
municipalities less dependent on the revenues from central government’s transfers. That 
is because, since municipalities are now able to decide the percentage of the income tax 
revenue they receive up to the 5% threshold, policy-makers predict an increase in inter-
municipal fiscal competition and in local political accountability for financial decisions 
(Teixeira et al., 2015). 
There still exists a considerable margin for municipalities to increase their 
variable participation rate in income tax by adopting higher tax rates (e.g., in 2015, 
municipalities chose not to receive a combined amount of 54.7 million euros) (Veiga et 
al., 2015). Table 2 shows the number of municipalities according to different participat ion 
rates of the “IRS”. The number of municipalities actively deciding on the variable 
participation rate has been growing, especially in the last three years: in the first seven 
years, on average, 196 municipalities (63.7%) have actively decided their participat io n 
rate; this number has risen to an average of 304 municipalities (98.6%) in the last three 
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years (shown in the second to last column of Table 2). This is a good indicator of an 
increased perception of higher fiscal competition in recent years. 
 
Table 2 
Number of municipalities according to the IRS variable participation rate (2008–2017) 
 
Source: Portuguese Tax Authority. Own calculations. 
 
The number of municipalities deciding on a variable participation rate under 5% 
(shown in column 6, “Below maximum rate”, in Table 2) – the municipalities that give 
up a percentage of the income tax they are entitled to in favour of their residents –, as 
well as the number of municipalities deciding to decrease their rates (given by the column 
“Changed tax rate decreased” in Table 3) tend to be higher in periods of local election 
(2009, 2013 and 2017, in bold in Tables 2 and 3), and lower in the years following the 
election periods. 
 
Table 3 
Number of municipalities according to changes in the IRS variable participation rate 
(2009–2017) 
 
Source: Portuguese Tax Authority. Own calculations. 
 
Year Maximum rate (5%)
Between 
maximum 
rate and 
minimum rate
Minimum 
rate (0%)
Minimum 
rate (0%) by 
default 
Below 
maximum 
rate
Actively 
deciding on 
the rate
Total
2008 143 35 9 121 165 187 308
2009 117 50 14 127 191 181 308
2010 122 56 10 120 186 188 308
2011 138 43 8 119 170 189 308
2012 156 36 7 109 152 199 308
2013 132 58 14 104 176 204 308
2014 148 65 13 82 160 226 308
2015 188 97 19 4 120 304 308
2016 202 86 18 2 106 306 308
2017 188 94 19 7 120 301 308
Total Increased Decreased
2009 227 81 30 51 308
2010 247 61 35 26 308
2011 253 55 36 19 308
2012 262 46 33 13 308
2013 244 64 22 42 308
2014 236 72 42 30 308
2015 202 106 86 20 308
2016 276 32 8 24 308
2017 267 41 4 37 308
Year Same tax rate
Changed tax rate Total
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These are indications that electoral process considerations may be influenc ing 
local politicians when they set the participation rate in Personal Income Tax revenues. It 
is also worth noting that some municipalities which set the participation rate very low 
(even to 0%) are dealing with unbalanced financial situations (Veiga et al., 2015). 
Since it is our goal to test whether fiscal interactions among municipalities occur 
– whether decisions on the participation rate in the Personal Income Tax of a municipal ity 
take into consideration the participation rates of neighbouring municipalities – and (if 
there is evidence of such interactions) whether they are, in the context of yardstick 
competition, shaped by political competition and accountability, the current environment 
lends additional relevance to our study. 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the variable participation rate in IRS 
for the period 2008–2017. The average rate value is 0.0317. The standard deviation values 
indicate that the observed values of the rate are substantially close to the average value. 
The small variation of the observed values around the average value is conditioned in part 
by the values being limited to the 0 to 5% rate margin. 
 
Table 4 
Statistics for the variable participation rate (2008–2017) 
 
Source: Portuguese Tax Authority. Stata computations. 
 
2.4. Portuguese local elections 
 
Each municipality has a City Council and a Municipal Assembly as their 
representative branches. The City Council has the executive power (it elaborates and 
implements local policies), whereas the Municipal Assembly is a deliberative body (it 
approves the overall framework of local policies) (Martins and Veiga, 2013). 
The members of the City Council and half of the Municipal Assembly are directly 
elected by the voters registered in the municipality. The other half of the Municipa l 
Assembly is reserved to the council presidents of the civil parishes located in that 
municipality (Veiga and Veiga, 2007). On local election day, residents vote for parties or 
independent lists presented for both local branches (local elections take place in the same 
Within Between Overall Within Between Overall Within Between Overall
−0.0133154 0 0 0.0766846 0.05 0.05 0.0316846 0.0166265 0.0145605 0.0220869
SDMaxMin Mean
  
 21 
day for every jurisdiction in Portugal). The outcome is determined by the D’Hondt 
method of transforming votes into mandates (Castro and Martins, 2013). The mayor of 
the municipality, who has a key role in the executive, is the first candidate from the list 
who gathers the larger amount of votes in the municipal elections for the City Council. 
Since the re-establishment of Democracy in 1974, local elections took place in 
1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 and in 2013. The current 
year, 2017, is also a local election year. 
Until the municipal elections of 2005, mayors did not have any legal limit on the 
number of previous terms in office. This changed with the Law 46/2005 of August 29th, 
which imposed a three four-year term limit restriction to every municipal office-holder. 
 
2.5. Assessing strategic interaction in local public finances in Portugal 
 
On a theoretical basis, strategic interactions are expected to be stronger on taxes 
levied on resources that are more mobile (e.g., Municipal Corporate Tax) or where 
electoral perception is stronger (e.g., Personal Income Tax) (Coimbra et al., 2011). 
The aim of our study is to assess the strategic interactions in local public finances 
in Portugal through the variable participation rate of the Personal Income Tax. As 
explained above, this strategic variable relies on the ability municipalities have to either 
return up to a maximum of 5% of the Personal Income Tax (“IRS”) to their residents or 
keep that amount as tax revenue. The ability to decide on returning a percentage of the 
income tax collected is still a very recent addition to the fiscal tools of the Portuguese 
municipalities, which can be seen as part of the ongoing trend of fiscal decentralizat ion 
that has been happening in several European countries. Thus, understanding if strategic 
interaction is a real phenomenon is not only of academic interest, but can also help design 
a better institutional framework. 
Because of the framework concerning the tax rates in our study – considering the 
homogenous institutional setting (which makes comparisons across municipalities more 
easy and clear), together with the increasing degree of tax transparency, local community 
engagement and fiscal decentralization, as well as the high visibility nature of the income 
tax –, we expect an increasing encouragement not only for local politicians to engage in 
more tax interactions but also for local voters to intensify comparisons across 
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jurisdictions that may ultimately hold opportunist politicians responsible by voters 
punishing bad performances. 
Indeed, the extent to which “resource-flow” models can accurately explain 
strategic interactions has been subject to much debate. According to Besley and Case 
(1995), it is reasonable to say that resource flows can only be a long-run solution to 
differences in the tax rates among jurisdictions. In the short-run, the ballot box can serve 
an important purpose which, even the long-run, gives citizens a less costly alternative to 
the “exit mechanism”. 
In fact, while the “exit” possibility in a fiscally autonomous jurisdiction allows 
for inter-jurisdictional mobility – a necessary condition for local tax competition –, in 
principle, the transaction costs of moving from one jurisdiction to another are potentially 
higher for residents than they are for firms. Because of that, mobility of voters is likely 
not as high as that of firms. This leaves some leeway for bad politicians’ tax policies to 
act out of line in what concerns their citizens’ preferences. It is also worthwhile pointing 
out that the models of local strategic interactions based on tax competition typically 
assume that voters are immobile (Reulier and Rocaboy, 2009). 
The yardstick competition hypothesis, on the other hand, puts the emphasis on the 
importance of the “voice mechanism”. Voice, in the sense of democratic rights, can be 
seen as a powerful instrument, a substitute for the “exit mechanism” (Schaltegger and 
Küttel, 2002), especially in a direct democratic institutional framework where voters 
make themselves heard by their voting power – the power to elect their desired local 
politicians. 
We believe that the 5% maximum tax margin in the variable participation in the 
Personal Income Tax, as important as it may be to sparkle strategic interaction (because 
of the very visible nature of the income tax), is not large enough to trigger significant 
inter-jurisdictional migratory movements. Therefore, tax and welfare competition are 
unlikely to be the drivers of strategic interaction resulting from the municipa l 
participation in the Personal Income Tax. 
Likewise, expenditure spillovers are also not likely to be the driver of strategic 
interaction, since the 5% maximum tax margin in the participation of municipalities in 
the tax revenue does not have an impact in the financing of local expenditures large 
enough to trigger a spillover effect. 
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Thus, a priori, yardstick competition seems to have the most potential explanatory 
power in the case of our strategic variable for the assessment of strategic interact ion 
among Portuguese municipalities. The yardstick comparison mechanism can give us 
powerful insights on the structure of local governments, especially in a context of 
decentralization and local government reforms (Bordignon et al., 2003). In fact, it may 
be the case that the pessimism regarding decentralized taxation may not be fully justified 
(Buettner and Schwerin, 2016). This is because yardstick competition helps to prevent 
bad politicians from extracting rents, making local governments more accountable by 
forcing them to align to efficient policies (Padovano and Petrarca, 2014), especially in 
electoral years. 
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Chapter 3. Empirical framework 
 
In this chapter, we present a summary of the standard methodology used to assess 
horizontal spatial strategic interactions in local public finances. This includes the 
presentation of the general form of the empirical reaction function which captures 
possible strategic interaction effects, of the criteria for the definition of neighbourhood 
(on which the spatial weights matrix is based), and of how to overcome the econometric 
issues that typically arise when estimating the reaction functions.  
Our study deals with spatial panel data models. We discuss the use of panel data, 
the spatial panel models to be estimated, and the estimation strategy method – the Quasi-
Maximum Likelihood (QML) method. 
 
3.1. Empirical model  
Methodologically, choosing between the two types of strategic interaction models 
– the spillover and the resource-flow models – poses a problem because, despite their 
differences, the reduced-form spatial reaction function is similar in both types of models 
(Brueckner, 2003). In particular, yardstick competition and tax/welfare competit ion 
models can generate a similar empirical framework, which would make empirica l 
evidence observationally equivalent and consistent with competing theories of local 
strategic interaction that have different normative implications (Brueckner and Saavedra, 
2001; Bordignon et al., 2003). 
In general, the reaction function relates each jurisdiction’s strategic decision 
variable, yi, to the jurisdiction’s own characteristics, Xi, and to the choices of ni reference 
neighbouring jurisdictions relative to the same strategic variable, yj. The equation to be 
estimated is, usually, of the following form (Brueckner, 2003): 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽 ∑ W𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 +𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝜽𝜽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖    (1) 
 
where β and θ represent unknown parameters, Wij is the neighbourhood weights 
matrix, and εi is an error term. 
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To distinguish between the drivers of strategic interactions, it is common to 
compare a baseline spillover model with one including, in addition, political variables as 
explanatory variables. If the latter improves the empirical likelihood of strategic 
interactions, there is evidence for yardstick competition. That is because the yardstick 
competition model assumes the behaviour of politicians is crucially dominated by 
electoral considerations, especially in the short-run (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998). 
According to Elhorst and Fréret (2009), there are two main approaches to identify 
yardstick competition. One approach is to conclude that if interactions among politicians 
who significantly react to tax rate changes in neighbouring jurisdictions are significant ly 
greater than those who do not, yardstick competition is present. The other approach 
follows the reasoning of Bordignon et al. (2003: 200): the “tax setting behaviour and the 
features of the electoral system should be considered at once in the empirical analysis”. 
Hence, this approach evaluates the impact of tax rates changes on the election results to 
test, for instance, whether spatial interaction dependence patterns are different in 
municipalities governed by an absolute or a simple majority (Costa and Carvalho, 2013). 
More recently, another method to test the yardstick competition theory has been 
proposed. In this line of research, the seminal hypothesis of yardstick competition is 
tested directly: whether voters punish incumbents for higher tax rates, and whether that 
punishment depends on the tax rates in neighbouring jurisdictions. This method is called 
yardstick voting, and it is tested by estimating a popularity/voting function of incumbents 
(Malderen and Gérard, 2013). 
Whatever the approach, if strategic interaction is driven by factors outside the 
political process, as tax competition predicts, the spatial correlation of tax rates should 
not differ with or without the inclusion of political variables. This implies that if tax 
mimicking is shown to be related with the political process, we are in the presence of 
yardstick competition, since it links spatial interactions with voting behaviour 
(Sedmihradská, 2013), and we can rule out tax competition as the driver for strategic 
interaction (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). In this study, considering the estimation results 
presented in Chapter 4, we do not attempt to test for yardstick competition. 
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3.2. Definition of neighbouring jurisdictions 
 
The definition of the criteria of neighbourhood, under which interaction between 
jurisdictions can be detected, is crucial for the empirical application. The definition of 
neighbours takes the analytical form of a spatial weights matrix, Wij, with non-negat ive 
weights. The spatial weighing matrix assigns the jurisdictions of reference and their 
relative weights (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998). 
These weights define the importance of the other j jurisdictions in the process of 
interaction (they dictate whether a given jurisdiction j and jurisdiction i interact), and they 
can be seen as part of jurisdiction i’s characteristics. 
We propose to follow the most commonly used approach that designs the weights 
matrix according to spatial geographical proximity criteria (see, among others, Ladd, 
1992; Besley and Case, 1995; Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; and Revelli, 2002). The 
geographical proximity criteria sets the jurisdictions of reference as the neighbours that 
share physical borders with one another, and these are weighted equally based on 
contiguity. 
In our study, the spatial weights matrix will be in Queen contiguity form (of the 
order 1 type). Queen contiguity is one of the three types of polygon contiguity. Under 
Rook contiguity, neighbour relationships occur between municipalities that share 
common edges. Under Bishop contiguity, neighbour relationships occur between 
municipalities that share common corners. Finally, under Queen contiguity, neighbour 
relationships occur between municipalities that share common geographical borders, 
regardless of boundary length (be it edges or corners). Figure 1 represents the three types 
of polygon contiguity.  
Figure 1  
Types of polygon contiguity 
 
Source: http://www.lpc.uottawa.ca/publications/moransi/moran.htm (adapted). 
Accessed on 05.07.2017. 
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The underlying assumption for spatial interaction is that the higher the spatial 
proximity between municipalities, the higher the degree of interaction is expected to be. 
In practice, a given element of the Wij matrix, ωij, has a positive value for jurisdictions j 
that share a border with i, while Wij = 0 is set for non-contiguous jurisdictions. In other 
words, if a jurisdiction i shares a border with ni jurisdictions, all its neighbours are 
weighted 1/ni and the remaining jurisdictions are weighted 0. As to exclude self-
neighbours, the diagonal elements ωii are set equal to 0 (Belotti et al., 2017).  
The weights matrix is thus row-normalized so that each row sum equals unity for 
each i; the resulting aggregate strategic variable set by neighbours is computed as a 
weighted average across reference jurisdictions (Brueckner, 2003; Lyytikäinen, 2012), 
∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖≠1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, in equation (1) above. 
This approach helps detecting tax mimicking since this is more feasible to arise 
among jurisdictions that share basic common characteristics, such as sharing the same 
geographic location (Buettner and Schwerin, 2016). However, there is also motivat ion 
for the use of alternative weighting approaches based on other similar features of 
jurisdictions (e.g., weighting matrices based on socio-economic distance or on 
demographic distances). For a broad discussion of alternative ways to measure 
neighbourhood, see Costa et al. (2015). 
 
3.3. Econometric issues 
 
According to the empirical literature, the estimation of the reaction function (1) 
poses three important spatial econometric issues which must be successfully addressed in 
order to produce reliable estimates: (i) endogeneity of the strategic variables of other 
jurisdictions; (ii) possible spatial error dependence; and (iii) possible correlation between 
each jurisdiction’s characteristics (Xi) and the error term (εi).  
In the presence of endogeneity (i), ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates reveal 
to be inconsistent and inappropriate for models that incorporate spatial effects, thus 
requiring the use of an alternative estimation method capable of overcoming the 
deficiencies of the OLS estimator: through Maximum Likelihood (ML), Quasi-Maximum 
Likelihood (QML), Instrumental Variables (IV), or Generalized Method of Moments 
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(GMM) techniques (Elhorst and Fréret, 2009; Anselin, 2010; Soro et al., 2016). Another 
alternative is to assume interaction occurs with a time lag, thus eliminating simultaneity, 
which makes OLS estimation consistent (Brueckner, 2003). 
Spatial error dependence (ii) arises through spatial autocorrelation of omitted 
variables. It occurs when ε is capturing omitted variables that are, themselves, spatially 
dependent. If such dependence is ignored, results of strategic interaction can be 
misleading. To deal with this problem, one approach is to use the ML method either 
taking into account the error structure, or assuming the absence of spatial error 
dependence (relying on hypothesis tests to verify these assumptions). Another approach 
is to rely on the IV estimation method (Brueckner, 2003). 
When the jurisdiction’s characteristics are correlated with the error term, both the 
ML and IV estimates are inconsistent. To correct this problem, one must find suitable 
instruments for the dependent variables, which can be a difficult task. An alternat ive 
approach is to use panel data, since estimation captures time-invariant jurisdictiona l 
characteristics, observed or unobserved, through jurisdiction’s specific intercepts. The 
use of panel data may also help to eliminate spatial error dependence (Brueckner, 2003). 
 
3.4. Spatial Panel Data models 
 
The spatial econometrics literature presents a panoply of models, which can be 
used empirically as a tool to detect and measure spatial interaction effects. These 
interaction effects are crucially assumed to decrease as distance between the spatial units 
increases (Belotti et al., 2017). 
While traditionally these models have been estimated with the use of cross-
sectional data, in more recent years, with the increasing availability of data sets, there has 
been a shift to using panel data in order to assess spatial interactions across spatial units 
and over time (Millo and Piras, 2012). 
The increasing use of panel data sets has come hand in hand with a growing 
interest in panel spatial econometrics, which has caused the development of estimatio n 
techniques for spatial panel models (Elhorst, 2013; Soro et al., 2016). Indeed, the use of 
panel data offers researchers “extended modelling possibilities as compared to the single 
equation cross-sectional setting” (Elhorst, 2014: 389), and enables “researches to take 
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into account the dynamics and control for the unobservable heterogeneity” (Lee and Yu, 
2010: 165). Specifically, models of tax mimicking using spatial panel data allow for non-
observed fixed local characteristics to be controlled for (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). 
Moreover, “panel data are generally more informative, and they contain more variation 
and less collinearity among the variables. The use of panel data results in a greater 
availability of degrees of freedom, and hence increases efficiency in the estimation. Panel 
data also allows for the specification of more complicated behavioural hypotheses, 
including effects that cannot be addressed using pure cross-sectional data” (Elhorst, 2013: 
6). 
In this study, we use the Stata software to estimate the following spatial panel data 
models, using strongly balanced panel data: the Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR); the 
Spatial Error Model (SEM); the Spatial Autocorrelation Model (SAC); the Spatial Durbin 
Model (SDM) and the Generalized Spatial Random-Effects Model (GSPRE). 
From the various estimation methods we have alluded to in the previous section 
(3.2.), all the models estimated in this study fall into the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood 
(QML) method. It is recognized that “the ML and QML methods are so far the most 
appropriate methods to fit spatial panels” (Soro et al., 2016: 2). 
In the aforementioned models, each period is given by 𝑡𝑡 = 1 … ,𝑇𝑇; 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is the n x T 
x 1 column vector of the dependent variable; 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 is the n x к matrix of regressors; W is the 
n x n matrix, which describes the spatial arrangement of the n units; and Wij represents 
the spatial weight associated to units i and j (Belotti et al., 2017). 
 
Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) 
 
The Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) postulates endogenous interact io n 
effects among the dependent variable (known as spatial lag – because the dependent 
variable is spatially lagged) (Soro et al., 2016). 
In this model, a municipality’s tax rate depends on a series of observed local 
characteristics and on neighbouring municipalities’ tax rates (Bordignon et al., 2003; 
Allers and Elhorst, 2005). 
The SAR model structure can be represented as: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =  𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 +𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡   𝑡𝑡 = 1 … ,𝑇𝑇  (2) 
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Where 𝜇𝜇 is a vector of parameters to be estimated for the fixed-effects variant. 
It is assumed that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2) and 𝐸𝐸�𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� = 0 for 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 and/or 𝑡𝑡 ≠ 𝑠𝑠 (Belotti 
et al., 2017). 
 
Spatial Error Model (SEM) 
 
The Spatial Error Model focuses on spatial autocorrelation across space in the 
error terms (known as error lag – because it incorporates a spatially autoregress ive 
process in the error term) (Soro et al., 2016; Belotti et al., 2017). 
In this model, a municipality’s tax rate depends on a series of observed local 
characteristics (which typically include structural characteristics of the jurisdiction; 
socio-demographic characteristics of the resident population; fiscal variables; and – in 
particular when testing the yardstick competition hypothesis – political variables) 
(Bordignon et al., 2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2005). 
The SEM model structure can be represented as: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡      (3) 
𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 =  𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡     (4) 
 
The Spatial Error Model can be shown to be a special case of both the Spatial 
Autocorrelation Model and the Spatial Durbin Model (Belotti et al., 2017). 
 
Spatial Autocorrelation Model (SAC) 
 
The Spatial Autocorrelation Model postulates a combination of both the 
interaction among the dependent variable and the interaction among the error terms. This 
model is also referred to as the spatial autoregressive with spatially autocorrelated errors 
(SARAR). It combines the Spatial Autoregressive Model with autoregress ive 
disturbances (a spatial autoregressive error) (Soro et al., 2016; Belotti et al., 2017).  
The SAC model structure can be represented as: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =  𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 +𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡     (5) 
𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 =  𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡     (4) 
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Where M is a spatial weights matrix that may or not be equal to W (they are equal 
in our study) (Belotti et al., 2017). 
 
Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) 
 
The Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) is a generalization of the Spatial Autoregress ive 
Model in which spatially lagged independent variables are also included as explanatory 
variables (Elhorst, 2014; Belotti et al., 2017). 
The SDM model structure can be represented as (Belotti et al., 2017): 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =  𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 +𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝑊𝑊𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃 + 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡   (6) 
 
Generalized Spatial Random-Effects Model (GSPRE) 
 
The Generalized Spatial Random-Effects Model (GSPRE) is a generalization of 
the Spatial Error Model in which the 𝜇𝜇 (a vector of parameters representing the panel 
effects) is spatially correlated (Belotti et al., 2017). 
The GSPRE model structure can be represented as: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡      (3) 
𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 =  𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡     (4) 
𝜇𝜇 = 𝛷𝛷𝑊𝑊𝜇𝜇 + 𝑛𝑛     (7) 
 
Where the vectors 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 are assumed as independently normally-distributed 
errors, which implies a random-effects variant, with 𝜇𝜇 = (𝐼𝐼 − 𝛷𝛷𝑊𝑊)−1𝑛𝑛  and 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 =(𝐼𝐼 − 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊)−1𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡  (Belotti et al., 2017).    
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Chapter 4. Empirical results 
 
In this chapter we present the results of our research. It includes a prelimina ry 
spatial-dependence analysis: firstly, we explore the Moran's I and Local Indicators of 
Spatial Association (LISA) statistics to see whether there is evidence of spatial effects 
and spatial clustering for our dependent variable – the municipalities’ variable 
participation rate of the Personal Income Tax (VPR). To test whether the detected 
neighbourhood effects can be attributed to strategic interactions between Portuguese 
municipalities, we estimate five spatial panel models, using panel data for the period 
2008–2015. These models are able to incorporate the spatial dependence through the 
spatial weights matrix. 
We first present a preliminary spatial-dependence analysis, the data and 
descriptive statistics for the interjurisdictional, fiscal and socio-demographic variables 
used in the study. Then, we analyse the empirical results obtained from the estimation of 
the spatial panel models. 
 
4.1. Preliminary spatial analysis 
 
In order to have a preliminary idea about the dynamics of the spatial dependence 
of our dependent variable, we use the Moran's I statistic using cross-sectional data for the 
years 2008–2017. 
The Moran’s I spatial statistical test is based on the spatial weights matrix, and it 
gives evidence for the presence of neighbourhood effects (Soro et al., 2016). The Moran’s 
I statistic tests for spatial autocorrelation, to see whether phenomena cluster in certain 
areas occur or if data are spread-out randomly through space. 
Firstly, as shown in Figure 2, we create a Box Plot to make sure our dependent 
variable follows a fairly normal distribution. 
The larger circle represents the mean. The remaining, smaller, circles give us the 
range of the variable. The rectangular area is the interquartile (25% to 75%) range of 
values assuming the whiskers’ distance is set equal to 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
The line in bold is the median. The black lines on the edges represent the reasonable 
extremes.. The circles outside the black lines are observations considered outliers. 
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Figure 2  
Box Plots for the variable participation rate 
 
Source: Portuguese Tax Authority. GeoDa computations. 
 
For the period 2008–2015, only the years 2015–2017 have outliers.2 That seems 
to entail the data follows a normal distribution (it is only slightly skewed in the last three 
years). 
All the remaining variables in our study also follow a normal distribution in the 
considered period (calculations performed in Statistica). If our data was skewed, 
problems related to error variance and standard errors could arise (Stieve, 2012). 
                                                 
2 The Box Plot for VPR of 2008, left-hand panel (in Figure 2 above), is illustrative of the period without 
outliers (2008–2014), while the Box Plot for VPR of 2015, right-hand panel is illustrative of the period 
with outliers (2015–2017). 
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To see whether there are spatial effects in the variable participation rate, we 
generated a spatial weights matrix in the Queen contiguity form (of the order 1 type) using 
the GeoDa software.  
As we can see in Figure 3, which depicts the number of neighbours and their 
frequency, our spatial weights also follow a normal distribution. Table 5 presents a 
summary characterization of the spatial weights matrix. The spatial weights matrix is 
comprised of 278 cross-sectional spatial units (all Portuguese mainland municipalities ). 
It has been row-normalized and it has a mean of approximately 5.3 contiguous units. The 
municipality “Nazaré” only has 1 neighbour, while “Santarém” and “Viseu” have 10 
neighbours each. 
 
Figure 3 
Spatial Weights Histogram 
 
Source: GeoDa computations. 
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Table 5 
Summary of the spatial-weights matrix 
 
Source: Stata computations. 
 
In Table 6, we present the results from the Moran’s I test for our dependent 
variable – the variable participation rate of the Personal Income Tax (VPR), for each 
individual year for the period 2008–2017. 
The test is significant in only 6 out of the 10 years considered (2008, 2009, 2010, 
2013, 2014 and 2017). That means that in 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2016, the spatial 
distribution of the variable participation rate values seems to be the result of random 
spatial processes. Moreover, even in the years for which there is evidence of spatially 
clustered values, test results show that there is a fairly low spatial autocorrelation pattern. 
In fact, the average Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation value for the 6 years with significant 
values is of a mere 0.0953. Since our spatial weights matrix has been row-normalized, a 
result of 0 would mean a purely random clustering pattern (Stieve, 2012). 
 
# of links Observations
1 1
2 17
3 18
4 48
5 78
6 51
7 34
8 20
9 9
10 2
Total 278
Min 1
Max 10
Mean 5.309353
Total 1476
Dimensions
278 x 278
Matrix Links
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Table 6 
Moran’s I test for the dependent variable 
 
Source: Portuguese Tax Authority. Own calculations (using GeoDa). 
 
In Figure 4, we include the Moran Scatter Plot for the year 2013, which is the year 
with the highest spatial autocorrelation for the variable participation rate of the Personal 
Income Tax (VPR). 
 
VPR Moran's I
2008 0.0845545
(2.4743)***
2009 0.101784
(2.8747)***
2010 0.0696371
(2.0797)**
2011 0.0363207
(1.1098)
2012 0.00448471
(0.2380)
2013 0.135455
(3.6179)***
2014 0.104655
(2.9357)***
2015 0.0110266
(0.4447)
2016 0.0216895
(0.7347)
2017 0.0757205
(2.1244)**
In parenthesis are the z-statistics.
*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Figure 4 
Moran Scatter Plot (VPR 2013) 
 
Source: Portuguese Tax Authority. Own calculations (using GeoDa). 
 
Complementarily, we use the Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) 
statistic to understand the spatial location of the clusters in continental Portugal. 
Figure 5 displays the LISA cluster maps for the years 2010 and 2013 (which 
correspond to the years of the lowest and highest significant values for the Moran's I 
statistic, respectively). It shows the presence of significant spatial clusters for the variable 
participation rate of the Personal Income Tax. Clusters of neighbouring municipalit ies 
exhibiting high rates are marked in red; clusters of neighbouring municipalities exhibit ing 
low rates are marked in blue; clustering between municipalities with low rates and 
municipalities with high rates are marked in purple; whereas clustering between 
municipalities with high rates and municipalities with low rates are marked in pink. 
Taking the period 2008–2017 in its entirety, the clustering undergoes changes in 
location and type over time. However, we can point to persistent clustering of 
municipalities in the northern region (mainly associated with low rates), in the eastern 
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part of the centre region, in Lisbon and Tagus Valley regions (mainly associated with 
high rates), and in the eastern part of the “Alentejo” region. 
Since spatial autocorrelation generally implies spatial clustering (Pisati, 2012), it 
is worthwhile pointing out that the municipalities which do not experience significant 
spatial clustering in their participation rates are the vast majority. In fact, for the period 
2008–2017, the number of municipalities associated with non-significant LISA statistic 
values range from 232 to 253 an thus, on average, 86.7% of municipalities do not exhibit 
significant clustering. 
Nevertheless, as can be seen in the maps in Figure 5, there is some evidence that 
participation rates might be spatially correlated. To test whether the detected 
neighbourhood effects can be attributed to strategic interactions between Portuguese 
municipalities, we make use of spatial panel data models, whose regressions are able to 
incorporate the spatial dependence through the generated spatial weights matrix. 
 
Figure 5 
LISA Cluster Maps 
 
Source: Portuguese Tax Authority. Own calculations (using GeoDa). 
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4.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The purpose of our study is to test whether there is evidence of fiscal strategic 
interactions between Portuguese municipalities for the municipalities’ variable 
participation rate in the Personal Income Tax. 
The following empirical research covers the period 2008–2015. As mentioned 
above, the spatial units are all the 278 mainland municipalities of Portugal. Data for each 
year was obtained from the Portuguese Tax Authority, the Directorate-General for Local 
Authorities, Statistics Portugal, and Institute of Employment and Professional Training 
(IEFP).  
The dependent variable of our study is the municipalities’ variable participat ion 
rate in the Personal Income Tax. 
The set of covariates in the analysis include interjurisdictional, fiscal and socio-
demographic variables as explanatory factors: the Neighbouring Variable Participat io n 
Rate, the Income Tax Transfers, the Unconditional Transfers, the Population Density, the 
Dependency Ratio, the Percentage of Registered Unemployment, and the Average 
Monthly Earnings.  
The Neighbouring Variable Participation Rate is the average participation rate in 
the Personal Income Tax of the municipalities that share a geographical border with the 
municipality. The coefficient of this interjurisdictional explanatory variable captures the 
degree of spatial strategic interactions when municipalities decide on their own 
participation rate (Kangasharju et al., 2006; Baskaran, 2014). In other words, this variable 
allows to measure whether municipalities take into consideration the rates set by 
neighbouring municipalities (Costa et al., 2011; Lyytikäinen, 2012). If the variable’s 
estimated coefficient is statistically significant with a positive sign, and the model’s 
spatial dependence parameters are both positive and significant, there is evidence of tax 
mimicking: an increase in the neighbours’ participation rates leads to a strategic increase 
in the municipality’s own participation rate. On the other hand, if the estimated coefficient 
has a negative sign, there is no evidence of tax mimicking: an increase in the neighbours ’ 
participation rates leads to a decrease in the municipality’s own participation rate. In other 
words, for there to be strategic interaction among municipalities, a change in the 
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participation rate of neighbouring municipalities has to lead to a change in the same 
direction in the municipality’s own participation rate (Costa et al., 2011). 
The remaining variables are introduced in the model to control for municipalities ’ 
fixed fiscal and socio-demographic local characteristics. 
The Personal Income Tax Transfers variable captures the per capita transfers 
received from the central government related to the 5% participation rate in IRS (its 
amount is collected from the municipality’s residents). This fiscal variable is a proxy of 
the municipality’s relative tax base capacity. Municipalities with higher income residents 
are more able to set higher tax rates (Costa et al., 2011). We expect this variable’s 
estimated coefficient to have a positive sign. 
The Unconditional Transfers variable is the total per capita unconditiona l 
transfers received by the municipality from the central government, which include 
unconditional current transfers and unconditional capital transfers. Municipalities that 
experience an increase in the amount of per capita unconditional transfers become less 
dependent on their own fiscal revenue, enabling municipalities to set lower tax rates 
(Costa et al., 2011; Padovano and Petrarca, 2014). We expect this fiscal variable’s 
estimated coefficient to have a negative sign. 
The Population Density variable is calculated as the total individuals by square 
kilometre. This socio-demographic variable can be seen as a proxy for agglomerat ion 
economies. Highly populated municipalities benefit from urban agglomerat ion 
economies, and therefore are more able to set higher tax rates (Costa et al., 2011). We 
expect this variable’s estimated coefficient to have a positive sign. 
The Dependency Ratio variable is calculated as the sum of the resident populatio n 
aged 0 to 14 years and the resident population aged 65 and over, divided by the working 
age population (the resident population aged 15 to 64 years). This variable captures the 
municipality’s social vulnerability. Municipalities whose residents are more socially 
vulnerable have less ability to set higher tax rates (Costa and Carvalho, 2013). On the 
other hand, municipalities with high dependency ratios also have higher costs (as we have 
discussed, Portuguese municipalities are responsible for offering services – such as 
childcare and leisure centres – that ensure the well-being of these two groups) and are 
thus expected to set higher tax rates (Costa et al., 2011). Because of that, the predicted 
sign of this socio-demographic variable is ambiguous (Padovano and Petrarca, 2014).  
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The Percentage of Registered Unemployment variable is the number of 
unemployed individuals registered in local employment centres as a proportion of the 
resident population aged 15 or more. This socio-demographic variable also captures the 
dimension of social vulnerability in the municipality, since it affects the ability of 
residents to pay taxes. Thus, municipalities with high registered unemployment are less 
able to set higher tax rates. We expect this variable’s estimated coefficient to have a 
negative sign. 
Similarly to Income Tax Transfers, the variable Average Monthly Earnings is also 
a reflection of the municipality’s relative tax base capacity. An increase in the monthly 
earnings of the municipality’s taxpayers means the tax base also increases. Municipalit ies 
with higher income residents are more able to set higher tax rates (Costa et al., 2011). We 
expect this socio-demographic variable’s estimated coefficient to have a positive sign. 
Table 7 lists the description and the data sources of each variable used in our 
study. 
 
Table 7 
Variables used in the study 
 
 
Following Lyytikäinen (2012), our empirical analysis is based on a model where 
all explanatory variables are lagged one period (t-1) except for the Neighbouring Variable 
Participation Rate. In doing so, we are assuming municipalities respond to 
contemporaneous tax rate changes from their neighbours. We believe this assumption 
accurately represents the Portuguese institutional setting.  
Most municipalities set their participation rate in the Personal Income Tax in the 
months of September to December. Moreover, municipalities can react to their 
Variable Description Source
VPR Variable participation rate in Income Tax of the municipality Portuguese Tax Authority
NVPR Mean variable participation rate in the neighbouring municipalities Own Calculations
T_IRSpc Income Tax Transfers received by the municipality, € per capita Directorate-General for Local Authorities
UTpc Total Unconditional Transfers received by the municipality, € per capita Directorate-General for Local Authorities
PopD Population Density in the municipality Statistics Portugal
Dr Total Dependency ratio in the municipality Statistics Portugal
UActive Percentage of registered unemployment in the municipality IEFP and Statistics Portugal
AvME Average monthly earnings in the municipality Statistics Portugal
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neighbours’ tax rates decisions by revising their participation rate – changing it 
accordingly. 3  This gives us good grounds to assume strategic interactions occur 
simultaneously and not with one year lag.  
By lagging all the other explanatory variables one period, we are assuming that 
when municipalities decide on their participation rates, they are using mostly current 
information that is available to them. 
Table 8 includes the summary statistics of the variables used in the model. 
 
Table 8 
Summary statistics of the variables (2008–2015) 
 
Source: Stata computations. 
 
The Overall variation gives us the variation over time and municipalities, the 
Between variation gives us the variation between municipalities (from one municipal ity 
to another), and the Within variation gives us the variation over time within 
municipalities. 
For our dependent variable, VPR, the mean is 0.03. The minimum and maximum 
give us the rate margin (0 and 0.05). The Overall standard deviation is 0.0225, the 
Between standard deviation is 0.0168 and the Within standard deviation is 0.015. The 
variable participation rate has higher between variation (rate variation from one 
municipality to another) than within variation (rate variation of a municipality over time). 
In the regressions, in order to mitigate the scale effect, all variables that are not in 
percentage form have been transformed using the logarithm function (Costa and 
Carvalho, 2013).                                                  
3 Click here to see the municipalities’ revised rate values for each year. 
Within Between Overall Within Between Overall Within Between Overall
VPR −0.013408 0 0 0.074092 0.05 0.05 0.030342 0.0150144 0.0168009 0.0225126
NVPR −0.010376 0.009375 0 0.070874 0.05 0.05 0.030249 0.0085615 0.0084586 0.0120259
T_IRSpc −40.37372 2.315744 0 84.38974 101.2203 128.598 21.24411 4.303617 13.426 14.07874
UTpc −609.6063 3.956522 0 706.2858 2088.869 2203.548 471.7655 51.93488 360.6897 363.847
PopD −687.4872 4.975 4.4 737.6128 7378.712 7397.7 309.7628 39.06428 856.5269 856.069
Dr 0.5076974 0.384125 0.374 0.6888224 1.0725 1.088 0.5920724 0.0160953 0.1150945 0.1160349
UActive 0.0095719 0.0200618 0.0117918 0.1025033 0.1144978 0.1404722 0.0570996 0.0124417 0.0174759 0.0214299
AvME 548.1414 665.3062 582.91 1235.813 1686.083 1883 851.3602 49.91441 150.5514 158.385
Min Max SD
Variables Mean
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4.3. Analysis of the empirical results 
 
Six models were estimated using the Stata software.4 
Model 1 is the Pooled OLS model, a non-spatial panel model (the spatial weights 
matrix is not used in this model). We estimate it mainly to see whether controlling for 
spatial dependence in the spatial panel models yields improvements. 
Model 2 is the SDM model, Model 3 is the SAR model, Model 4 is the SEM 
model, Model 5 is the SAC model – a combination of Models 3 and 4 –, and Model 6 is 
the GSPRE model. The spatial panel models are fitted using the QML estimation method. 
The better choice between these spatial econometric models depends on the type 
of spatial interaction effects to be accounted for (spatially lagged dependent variable; 
spatially lagged independent variables; spatially autocorrelated error term; or a 
combination of these) and whether or not spatial specific and/or time specific effects 
should be accounted for (and whether to treat them as fixed or random effects) (Elhorst, 
2014). 
Models which introduce spatial fixed-effects prevent the “interference of local 
specificities in the evaluation of the spatial interaction factor” (Costa and Carvalho, 2013: 
19) and only use the time-series data; whereas time fixed-effects are used to control for 
all period-specific spatial-invariant variables (Reulier and Rocaboy, 2009). Models 
without such controls use both time-series and cross-sectional data (Elhorst and Fréret, 
2009). 
To decide between the fixed-effects and random-effects variants, a robust version 
of the Hausman (1978) statistic test was performed for the SDM, SAR and SEM models. 
The robust Hausman test results are shown in Table 9. 
Results from the robust Hausman tests indicate that, for our panel data analysis, 
the fixed-effects variant is always the appropriate choice: we strongly reject the null 
                                                 
4 The use of software to estimate spatial panel data models was not without its challenges. While there is 
the option of using routines in Matlab, the splm package in R, or the xsmle command in Stata, the amount 
of resources that show empirical researchers the skills and techniques needed to use any of the spatial panel 
econometrics software packages is still limited. With that in mind, I made a YouTube tutorial on "How to 
Estimate Spatial Panel Data Models in Stata", with the creation and managing of the spatial weights matrix 
being done first in GeoDa (click here for a link to the video). The tutorial is a by-product of the empirical 
work developed in this dissertation. I am humbled by the reception the video has received so far. 
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hypothesis that differences in coefficients of the random-effects variant are not 
systematic; the alternative hypothesis being that the fixed-effects variant is consistent and 
the random-effects variant is inconsistent. 
As for the SAC model, we estimate the fixed-effects variant because “the 
literature focuses on the fixed-effects variant of this specification as the random-effec ts 
variant can be written as a special case of the SAR specification” (Belotti et al., 2017: 3). 
The GSPRE cannot be estimated with the fixed-effects variant. 
In our spatial fixed-effects estimates, the data has been transformed according to 
Lee and Yu (2010) to yield consistent QML estimators with properly centred 
distributions. 
The regressions include robust standard errors estimations and robust variance 
estimations which accurately take into account the cluster-correlated data, by adjusting 
for within-cluster correlation. The robust variance used goes under the names “Huber 
(1967)/White (1980)/sandwich” estimate of variance. 
 
Table 9 
Robust Hausman test results 
 
Source: Stata computations. 
 
To find the spatial panel model that better fits the data, we use the strategy 
described in Belotti et al. (2017). 
As we have seen in section 3.3., the SDM model structure is the following: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =  𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 +𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝑊𝑊𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃 + 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡   (6) 
 
Spatial Panel Model Hausman test
Prob ≥ chi2 = 0.0000
chi2(15) = 51.00
Prob ≥ chi2 = 0.0000
chi2(8) = 47.70  
Prob ≥ chi2 = 0.0024
chi2(8) = 23.92
SDM
SAR
SEM 
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It can be shown that if 𝜃𝜃 = 0 and 𝜌𝜌 ≠ 0 (null hypothesis), the model is a SAR 
(Belotti et al., 2017). Performing the test, we strongly reject the null hypothesis, with a p-
value lower than one percent. 
On the other hand, if 𝜃𝜃 = −𝛽𝛽𝜌𝜌 (null hypothesis), the model is a SEM (Belotti et 
al., 2017). Performing the test, we again strongly reject the null hypothesis, with a p-value 
lower than one percent.  
For now the SDM seems to be the better fit for our data. 
To decide whether the SAC model is a better fit, we use the Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for both the SAC and SDM 
models: given two models fitted on the same data set, the larger the value of these 
measures, the worse the model is considered to fit. Results show the SDM model to be a 
slightly better fit for our data (see Table 10). 
Finally, to compare the SDM and GSPRE models, we also look at their AIC and 
BIC measures. AIC and BIC results indicate the GSPRE model to better fit the data 
(though again only slightly – see Table 10). 
Altogether, the tests point to a spatial fixed-effects SDM and to the GSPRE model. 
The estimation results are given in Table 10. 
The variable Neighbouring Variable Participation Rate has, as expected, positive 
estimated coefficients in every model, except in the SDM. 
In every spatial panel model, however, the variables introduced to control for 
municipalities’ fixed fiscal and socio-demographic local characteristics have no 
statistically significant effect on participation rates, except for Population Density in the 
SDM (where it has, as expected, a positive estimated coefficient). 
Looking at the Table 10 results, the overall R-squared for each of the models is 
fairly small (the average overall R-squared for the 6 panel models is a mere 0.059). The 
two previous papers that have studied our dependent variable (the variable participat io n 
rate in the Personal Income Tax) – Coimbra et al. (2011) and Costa et al. (2011) – believe 
their estimation results for this variable may have been influenced by the small amplitude 
of the rate. Because the model with the highest overall R-squared is the non-spatial Pooled 
OLS model (with the R-squared of 0.1103 and the adjusted R-Squared of 0.1075), we 
believe that can be seen as an indication that accounting for spatial dependence may not 
be adequate for our data.
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Table 10 
Panel estimation results for the IRS variable participation rate  
(1) Non-spatial Panel Model (3) Spatial Panel Model: SAR (4) Spatial Panel Model: SEM (5) Spatial Panel Model: SAC (6) Spatial Panel Model: GSPRE
β vector θ vector
NVPR 0.2943103 −0.8001045 2.281385 0.4774585 1.111403 1.087473 1.09989
(7.44)*** (−11.23)*** (22.78)*** (9.71)*** (42.28)*** (34.69)*** (14.54)***
T_IRSpc 0.012286 0.0014993 −0.000624 0.0004389 0.000894 0.0008922 0.0029573
(6.65)*** (0.89)' (−0.21) (0.19)' (0.57) (0.57) (0.40)'
UTpc 0.0046337 0.0015358 0.0046721 0.0019923 0.0024526 0.0024546 0.0011124
 (2.12)** (0.57)' (0.95)' (0.59)' (1.00)' (1.00)' (0.10)'
PopD 0.0013387 0.0720781 0.0952976 −0.0714594 0.0336709 0.0337347 0.0006722
(0.86)' (2.44)** (1.89)' (−1.54) (1.63)' (1.63)' (0.04)'
Dr −0.0095089 0.0241225 −0.0169779 0.025581 0.0116471 0.0116519 −0.0016406
 (−1.60) (1.03)' (−0.52) (0.84)' (0.77)' (0.77)' (−0.02)
UActive 0.0391521 −0.0093956 0.0448991 0.0357114 0.0061598 0.006177 −0.0083323
(1.65)* (−0.23) (0.80)' (0.86)' (0.32) (0.32) (−0.07)
AvME 0.0413893 −0.0251696 −0.0157267 0.0087709 −0.0139364 −0.0139269 −0.010094
 (4.89)*** (−1.46) (−0.57) (0.45)' (−1.29) (−1.29) (−0.18)
Constant −0.1259204 0.0202922
(−4.56)*** (0.14)'
Spatial Rho 0.0006958 0.0240339
(0.36)' (1.91)*
Spatial Lambda −1.107965 −1.108292 −1.097322
(−33.58)*** (−33.73)*** (−17.43)***
Spatial Phi −1.135628
(−6.86)***
Variance (e) 0.0002323 0.0001433 0.0001432 0.012025
(19.75)*** (21.31)*** (21.36)*** (18.14)***
Variance (mu) 0.0123651
(9.85)***
Mean of FE 0.1038  −0.0413 −0.0603
Log-likelihood 5380.4381 5629.9499 6573.3649 6573.3531
Panel length (years) 8 7 7 7 8
Groups (municipalities) 278 278 278 278 278
Observations 2224 1946 1946 1946 2224
AIC −10807.73 −10742.88 −11241.9 −11240.12 −12205.62
BIC −10762.08 −10692.71 −11191.74 −11184.38 −12137.14
Adj R-sq 0.1075
R-sq: within 0.0982 0.0891 0.0944 0.0900
          between 0.0474 0.0533 0.0544 0.0257
          overall 0.1103 0.0198 0.0543 0.0556 0.0510
In parenthesis are the t-statistics / z-statistics.
*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
* Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
(2) Spatial Panel Model: SDM
Variables
0.0656
0.0611
−12014.4
0.5553
1946
−12103.57
7
278
−0.2350
6067.7874
0.0001146
 (19.55)***
Pooled OLS SEM with spatial autoregressive RE
−0.0022815
(−0.62)
SEM with spatial FE SAC with spatial FESDM with spatial FE SAR with spatial FE
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In an attempt to understand and possibly improve the estimation results for our 
dependent variable, we re-estimated the models relaxing the control variables that were 
initially used. We found that, no matter the combination of control variables we use, the 
general fit of the models remained virtually unchanged: the estimated coefficients 
remained very small (close to 0) and the R-squared, Log likelihood, and AIC/BIC of the 
regressions did not appear to improve. The exception to that was for the SDM estimates; 
while the impact of the control variables' coefficients remained nearly the same (close to 
0) no matter what control variables we considered, when we consider a specification with 
only the covariate NVPR, the general fit of the model, judging by the R-squared, 
improved greatly – see Table 11 for the re-estimation results. 
 
Table 11 
SDM re-estimation results for the IRS variable participation rate 
 
Source: Stata computations. 
 
Considering the spatial dependence factors of the spatial regressions, the SDM 
specification, including the re-estimated SDM, has a negative and statistica lly 
insignificant spatial interaction factor (given by its Spatial Rho); the SAR specificat ion 
has a positive but statistically insignificant spatial interaction factor (given by its Spatial 
Rho); the SEM specification has a negative statistically significant spatial interact ion 
β vector θ vector
NVPR −0.8157468 2.158508
(−11.27)*** (22.45)***
Spatial Rho
Variance (e) 
Variance (mu) 
Mean of FE
Log-likelihood
Panel length (years)
Groups (municipalities)
Observations
AIC
BIC
Adj R-sq
R-sq: within
          between
          overall
In parenthesis are the t-statistics / z-statistics.
*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
0.5306
Variables
278
1946
−12066.49
−12044.2
0.5412
0.5293
(−0.72)
0.0001183
 (19.99)***
−0.0098
6037.2454
7
SDM with spatial FE
−.0025463
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factor (given by the Spatial Lambda); the SAC specification has a positive and 
statistically significant Spatial Rho and a negative statistically significant Spatial 
Lambda; and the GSPRE specification has negative statistically significant interact ion 
factors (given by its Spatial Lambda and Spatial Phi). 
These spatial dependence parameters (given by the Spatial Rho, Spatial Lambda 
and Spatial Phi, depending on the model considered) reflect the spatial dependence 
present in our data set. They measure the average influence of the neighbour ing 
municipalities on a given municipality (GIS Institute, 2017). 
Allers and Elhorst (2005) interpret a positive and significant Spatial Rho as 
evidence of tax mimicking, while Bordignon et al. (2003) interpret a positive and 
significant Spatial Lambda as evidence of tax mimicking. 
From the results of the variable Neighbouring Variable Participation Rate, there 
is a clear relationship between neighbouring municipalities’ tax rates: the estimates are 
highly significant and have the expected positive sign in every model, except in the SDM 
with spatial fixed effects. 
However, these neighbouring effects, in the absence of significant spatial effects, 
only capture the fact that there are significant differences between participation rates 
among municipalities (Kangasharju et al., 2006), and thus do not provide evidence of 
strategic interactions. Otherwise, the Pooled OLS model would be sufficient to assert the 
existence of strategic interactions. Indeed, for the spatial effect of strategic interaction to 
be captured (i.e., the effect of change in the neighbouring participation rates on the 
municipality’s own participation rate), the spatial panel models have to yield positive 
significant spatial dependence factors. 
From the five spatial panel models considered, the only model with a positive 
statistically significant spatial dependence factor is the SAC model, with a small yet 
significant Spatial Rho of 0.024 (see Table 10). 
Coimbra et al. (2011) interpret a positive and significant Spatial Rho (even in the 
presence of a negative coefficient for the Spatial Lambda) in the SAC model as evidence 
of strategic interaction. Thus, we find some empirical evidence of spatial strategic 
interaction occurring among Portuguese municipalities in the case of the variable 
participation rate in the Personal Income Tax. In the SAC specification, municipalit ies 
seem to take into consideration the participation rates of neighbouring municipalit ies 
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when deciding on their own participation rates: a percentage point increase in the average 
neighbouring municipalities' participation rates leads to a 1.087 percentage point increase 
in the municipality's own participation rate. 
It must be pointed out, however, that the SAC’s Spatial Rho coefficient is 
objectively small. Moreover, from the model selection analysis described above, the SAC 
model does not appear to be the best fit for our data; the SDM and GSPRE models seem 
to perform better. Estimates from the SDM and GSPRE models reveal a negative 
influence of spatial dependency factors. Both these models provide no evidence of 
strategic interactions. Moreover, the NVPR estimates are contrary to expected sign in the 
case of the SDM. 
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Conclusions 
 
The present study attempted to assess the existence of fiscal strategic interactions 
between the 278 municipalities of mainland Portugal for the variable participation rate in 
the Personal Income Tax, covering the period 2008–2015. 
Considering the current Portuguese institutional framework and the inherent high 
visibility nature of the personal income tax, we believe that the most likely driver of the 
possible strategic interactions is, a priori, yardstick competition. The 5% maximum tax 
margin in the variable participation rate in the Personal Income Tax is unlikely to be large 
enough to trigger significant inter-jurisdictional migratory movements, making tax and 
welfare competition unlikely drivers of strategic interaction. Likewise, expenditure 
spillovers are not likely to be a driver of strategic interaction, since the 5% maximum 
participation of municipalities in the tax revenue does not have a large enough impact in 
the financing of local expenditures to trigger a spillover effect. 
For the period 2008–2017, a preliminary spatial analysis provides some evidence 
of spatial effects and of spatial clustering for the municipalities’ participation rate of the 
Personal Income Tax. The Moran's I statistic indicates the presence of significant 
neighbourhood effects for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2014 and 2017. However, 
the average spatial autocorrelation for these six years is merely of 0.0953 (a result of 0 
would indicate a random pattern in the clustering). The Local Indicators of Spatial 
Association (LISA) statistic points to significant spatial clustering of participation rate 
values in, on average, 13.3% of Portuguese mainland municipalities. 
To test whether neighbourhood effects can be attributed to strategic interactions 
between Portuguese municipalities, we estimated different spatial panel data models. 
Overall, estimation results show no statistically significant positive spatial 
dependence parameters, and thus provide no empirical evidence of strategic interactions. 
Only in the SAC specification do we find a positive and statistically significant spatial 
dependence factor. This provides us some empirical evidence of spatial strategic 
interaction occurring among Portuguese municipalities in participation rates: a percentage 
point increase in the average neighbouring municipalities' participation rates leads to a 
1.087 percentage point increase in the municipality's own participation rate. It is, 
however, very important to put this result into perspective. From a model selection 
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analysis, the SAC model is not the best fit for our data. Moreover, its positive spatial 
dependence factor’s coefficient is a mere 0.024. That, together with the weak spatial 
autocorrelation results from the Moran’s I and LISA statistics, make us reticent about the 
appropriateness of pointing to strategic interactions in variable participation rates. Our 
results are aligned to those of Coimbra et al. (2011): using 2009 cross-sectional data, only 
the SAC specification provided evidence of strategic interactions among Portuguese 
municipalities when deciding on the variable participation rate. 
With fiscal decentralization at the centre of the current Portuguese policy agenda, 
we believe understanding whether strategic interaction is a real phenomenon is not only 
of academic interest but can also help reformists design a better institutional framework. 
Since one of the objectives of the current Local Finance Law (Law 73/2013, September 
3rd) is to improve inter-municipal fiscal competition and electoral accountability, our 
results work as an assessment tool for forthcoming decentralization policies. 
We believe that the estimation results concerning the variable participation rate in 
the Personal Income Tax may be related to the small amplitude of the rate margin. Indeed, 
a 5% margin for municipalities to set their participation rates does not seem enough to 
justify a wide range of different rate values (for example, in 2017, 42% of municipalit ies 
decided on a 5% rate). Should the 5% rate margin be increased by Law, the relative 
importance of the participation rate would increase for both local politicians (mayors 
would have the opportunity to further increase their tax revenues) and people within each 
municipality (the higher the rate margin, the more likely residents are to pressure mayors 
into aligning their participation rates with those of neighbouring municipalities). Thus, 
assuming a high perception of this local rate, increasing the maximum rate could spark 
spatial clustering and strategic interactions over time, with an expected corresponding 
increase in electoral accountability through the yardstick mechanism, similar to other 
Portuguese local taxes: the Municipal Tax on Real Property, the municipal surcharge on 
Corporate Income Tax and the Municipal Tax on Real Property, as evidenced in Costa et 
al. (2011) and Costa and Carvalho (2013). 
Some suggestions for future research include the use of alternative spatial weights 
matrix specifications, as well as the assumption that strategic interactions do not occur 
simultaneously, but with a time lag, allowing for slower reactions to neighbours’ variable 
participation rate changes.  
  
 52 
References 
 
Allers, M. and Elhorst, J. P. (2005), “Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition among 
Local Governments in the Netherlands”, International Tax and Public Finance, 
12(4): 493–513. 
Anselin, L. (2010), “Thirty years of Spatial Econometrics”, Papers in Regional Science, 
89(1): 3–25. 
Baleiras, R. N. (1997), "Local Finance in Portugal Rules and Performance", Nova SBE 
Working Papers, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. 
Barreira, A. P. (2011), “Spatial Strategic Interaction on Public Expenditures of the 
Northern Portuguese Local Governments”, Spatial and Organizational Dynamics, 
6: 23–36. 
Baskaran, T. (2014), “Identifying Local Tax Mimicking with Administrative Borders and 
a Policy Reform”, Journal of Public Economics, 118: 41–51. 
Belotti, F; Hughes, G. and Mortari, A. P. (2017), “Spatial Panel Data Models using Stata”, 
The Stata Journal, 17(1): 139–180. 
Besley, T. and Case, A. (1995), “Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and 
Yardstick Competition”, American Economic Review, 85(1): 25–45. 
Bordignon, M.; Cerniglia, F. and Revelli, F. (2003), “In Search of Yardstick Competition: 
A Spatial Analysis of Italian Municipality Property Tax Setting”, Journal of 
Urban Economics, 54(2): 199–217. 
Brueckner, J. K. (2003), “Strategic Interaction among Governments: An Overview of 
Empirical Studies”, International Regional Science Review, 26(2): 175–188. 
Brueckner, J. K. and Saavedra, L. A. (2001), “Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic 
Property-Tax Competition?”, National Tax Journal, 54(2): 203–230. 
Buettner, T. (2001), “Local Business Taxation and Competition for Capital: the Choice 
of the Tax Rate”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 31(2/3): 215–245. 
  
 53 
Buettner, T. and Schwerin, A. V. (2016), “Yardstick Competition and Partial 
Coordination: Exploring the Empirical Distribution of Local Business Tax Rates”, 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 124: 178–201. 
Case, A. C.; Rosen, H. S. and Hines Jr., J. R. (1993), “Budget Spillovers and Fiscal Policy 
Interdependence: Evidence from the States”, Journal of Public Economics, 52(3): 
285–307. 
Casto, V. and Martins, R. (2013), “Running for Office Again: Evidence from Portuguese 
Municipal Elections”, Public Choice, 156: 677–702. 
Coimbra, M. L.; Costa, J. S. and Carvalho, A. (2011), “Fiscal Competition among 
Portuguese Municipalities”, Revista Portuguesa de Estudos Regionais, 28: 26–38. 
Costa, H.; Veiga, L. G. and Portela, M. (2015), “Interactions in Local Governments' 
Spending Decisions: Evidence from Portugal”, Regional Studies, 49(9): 1441–
1456. 
Costa, J. S. (2006), O Financiamento da Administração Local. Norte2015. 
Costa, J. S. (2011), “Fiscal Policy to Promote Financial Sustainability in Portuguese 
Municipalities”, 17th APDR Congress: Bragança – 2011. 
Costa, J. S. and Carvalho, A. (2013), “Yardstick Competition among Portuguese 
Municipalities: The Case of Urban Property Tax (IMI)”, FEP Working Papers, 
no. 495, School of Economics and Management, University of Porto. 
Costa, J. and Lança, L. (2013), Local Finance Benchmarking Country Report: Portugal. 
Council of Europe. 
Costa, J. S., Carvalho, A. and Coimbra M. L. (2011), “Is There Yardstick Competition 
among Portuguese Municipalities?”, Urban Public Economics Review, 15: 33–62. 
Delgado, F. J. and Mayor, M. (2011), “Tax Mimicking among Local Governments: Some 
Evidence from Spanish Municipalities”, Portuguese Economic Journal, 10(2): 
149–164. 
Elhorst, J. P. (2013), “Spatial Panel Models”, Handbook of Regional Science. 
Forthcoming. 
  
 54 
Elhorst, J. P. (2014), “Matlab Software for Spatial Panels”, International Regional 
Science Review, 37(3): 389–405. 
Elhorst, J. P. and Fréret, S. (2009), “Evidence of Political Yardstick Competition in 
France using a Two-Regime Spatial Durbin Model with Fixed Effects”, Journal 
of Regional Science, 49(5): 931–951. 
Gérard, M.; Jayet, H. and Paty, S. (2010), “Tax Interactions among Belgian 
Municipalities: Do interregional differences matter?”, Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 40(5): 336–342. 
Geys, B. (2006), “Looking Across Borders: A Test of Spatial Policy Interdependence 
using Local Government Efficiency Ratings”, Journal of Urban Economics, 
60(3): 443–462. 
GIS Institute (2017), Spatial Regression with GeoDa. Available at https://cga-
download.hmdc.harvard.edu/publish_web/GIS_Institute/2017_summer/OpenGe
oDa3.doc. Accessed on 05.07.2017. 
Heyndels, B. and Vuchelen, J. (1998), “Tax Mimicking among Belgian Municipalitie s”, 
National Tax Journal, 51(1): 89–101. 
Huber, P. J. (1967), “The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates Under 
Nonstandard Conditions”, Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on 
Mathematical Statistics and Probability. Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1: 221–233. 
Jorge, S. M.; Camões, P. J.; Carvalho, J. B. C. and Fernandes, M. J. (2006), Portuguese 
Local Government Relative Efficiency: A DEA Approach. Hamburg, Germany. 
8th CIGAR Workshop on Performance Measurement and Output Based 
Budgeting in the Public Sector. 
Kangasharju, A.; Moisio, A.; Reulier, E. and Rocaboy, Y. (2006), “Tax Competition 
among Municipalities in Finland”, Urban Public Economics Review, 5: 12–23. 
Ladd, H. F. (1992), “Mimicking of Local Tax Burdens Among Neighboring Counties”, 
Public Finance Quarterly, 20: 450–467. 
  
 55 
Lee, L. and Yu, J. (2010), “Estimation of Spatial Autoregressive Panel Data Models with 
Fixed Effects”, Journal of Econometrics, 154(2): 165–185. 
Lyytikäinen, T. (2012), “Tax Competition among Local Governments: Evidence from a 
Property Tax Reform in Finland”, Journal of Public Economics, 96(7): 584–595. 
Malderen, L. V. and Gérard, M. (2013), “Testing Yardstick Competition through a Vote-
function: Evidence from the Walloon Municipalities”, Economics and Business 
Letters, 2(4): 206–214. 
Martins, R. and Veiga, F. J. (2013), “Economic Voting in Portuguese Municipa l 
Elections”, Public Choice, 155(3): 317–334. 
Millo, G. and Piras, G. (2012), “splm: Spatial Panel Data Models in R”, Journal of 
Statistical Software, 47(1): 1–38. 
Padovano, F. and Petrarca, I. (2014), “Are the Responsibility and Yardstick Competition 
Hypotheses Mutually Consistent?”, European Journal of Political Economy, 34: 
459–477. 
Pinho, M. M. and Veiga, L. G. (2005), “The Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants 
in Portugal: a Public Choice Approach”, Congress of the European Regional 
Science Association: Porto – 2004. 
Pisati, M. (2012), Spatial Data Analysis in Stata an Overview. Available at 
http://www.stata.com/meeting/italy12/abstracts/materials/it12_pisati.pdf. 
Accessed on 05.07.2017. 
Reulier, E. and Rocaboy, Y. (2009), “Regional Tax Competition: Evidence from French 
Regions”, Regional Studies, 43(7): 915–922. 
Revelli, F. (2002), “Testing the Taxmimicking versus Expenditure Spill-over Hypotheses 
using English Data”, Applied Economics, 34(14): 1723–1731. 
Saavedra, L. A. (2000), “A Model of Welfare Competition with Evidence from AFDC”, 
Journal of Urban Economics, 47(2): 248–279. 
Salmon, P. (1987), “Decentralization as an Incentive Scheme”, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 3(2): 24–43. 
  
 56 
Schaltegger, C. A. and Küttel, D. (2002), “Exit, Voice, and Mimicking Behavior : 
Evidence from Swiss Cantons”, Public Choice, 113(1): 1–23. 
Sedmihradská, L. (2013), “Yardstick Competition in Case of the Czech Property Tax”, 
Review of Economic Perspectives, 13(2): 77–91. 
Shleifer, A. (1985), “A Theory of Yardstick Competition”, RAND Journal of Economics, 
16(3): 319–327. 
Solé-Ollé, A. (2003), “Electoral Accountability and Tax Mimicking: the Effects of 
Electoral Margins, Coalition Government, and Ideology”, European Journal of 
Political Economy, 19(4): 685–713. 
Soro, W. L.; Zhou, Y. and Wayoro, D. (2016), “Crash Rates Analysis in China using a 
Spatial Panel Model”, IATSS Research. 
Stieve, T. (2012), Moran’s I and Spatial Regression. Available at 
http://sites.tufts.edu/gis/files/2013/11/Morans-I-and-Spatial-Regression.docx. 
Accessed on 05.07.2017 
Teixeira, M. E. O.; Rocha, R. M. and Miranda, N. (2015), “O Poder Tributário das 
Autarquias Locais”, Portucalense Law Journal, 17: 109–156. 
Tiebout, C. M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 64(5): 416–424. 
Veiga, F.; Tavares, A.; Carballo-Cruz, F.; Veiga, L. and Camões, P. (2015), 
Monitorização da Evolução das Receitas e das Despesas dos Municípios. 
Universidade do Minho. Estudo adjudicado pela Direção Geral das Autarquias 
Locais (DGAL). 
Veiga, L. G. (2003), The Political Economy of Local Governments’ Expenditures. 
Universidade do Minho. Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento 
Regional. 
Veiga, L. G. and Pinho, M. M. (2007), “The Political Economy of Intergovernmenta l 
Grants: Evidence from a Maturing Democracy”, Public Choice, 133(3): 457–477. 
Veiga, L. G. and Veiga, F. J. (2007), “Political Business Cycles at the Municipal Level”, 
Public Choice, 131(1/2): 45–64. 
  
 57 
White, H. (1980), “A Heteroskedasticity-consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a 
Direct Test for Heteroscedasticity”, Econometrica, 48: 817–830. 
Wilson, J. D. (1986), “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition”, Journal of Urban 
Economics, 19(3): 296–315. 
Zodrow, G. R. and Mieszkowski, P. (1986), “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the 
Underprovision of Local Public Goods”, Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3): 
356–370. 
